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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AND THE DOCTRINE
OF WAIVER THROUGH THE DELIBERATE
BYPASS OF STATE PROCEDURES
The last decade has seen the concept of "due process" ex-
pand until "it appears that there is no present fixed limitation
to that concept."' Accompanying this expansion has been an
equally vigorous development of the "federal system's right
of intervention and intrusion into state criminal convictions12
through the federal writ of habeas corpus. This latter develop-
ment has led one Justice of the Supreme Court of Louisiana to
conclude that "[u] nder federal review of applications for writs of
habeas corpus the doctrine of finality of judgments has been al-
most totally abandoned, and state procedural laws designed to
promote and accomplish prompt, orderly, expeditious, and just
determination of criminal prosecutions have been disregarded.13
This erosion of the finality of state court convictions gathered
momentum in 1963 with the United States Supreme Court's de-
cision in Fay v. Noia.4 The Court, reviewing a petition for habeas
corpus from a state prisoner who alleged his murder conviction
was based upon an unconstitutionally obtained confession, held
that the federal district court had the power to grant relief de-
spite the prisoner's failure to seek state appellate review of his
claimed constitutional defect. However, mindful of the impact
of the decision on state court convictions, the Court conceded
that the federal courts had discretion to deny relief to an appli-
cant who had "deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of
the state courts." The Court also indicated that the bypass of
state procedures had to be made deliberately by the petitioner-
not solely by defense counsel as part of his trial strategy. Fur-
thermore, the determination of waiver was said to be a federal
question because it dealt with federal rights. Thus, a state court's
finding of waiver was not binding on the federal court.6
1. LA. CODE Cium. P. art. 362, comment (i).
2. State ex rel. Barksdale v. Dees, 252 La. 434, 442, 211 So.2d 318, 321
(1968). Landmark cases in the development of a broadened view toward
federal habeas are Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
3. Justice Barham in State ex rel. Barksdale v. Dees, 252 La. 434, 441,
211 So.2d 318, 321 (1968).
4. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
5. Id. at 438.
6. Id. at 439: "If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent
counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege
of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for
1971]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Later, in Henry v. Mississippi,7 the Supreme Court, by writ
of certiorari, reviewed a conviction allegedly based upon illegally
seized evidence. The Supreme Court of Mississippi had affirmed
the conviction because the petitioner had failed to timely ob-
ject.8 The United States Supreme Court held that "a litigant's
procedural default in state proceedings does not prevent vindi-
cation of his federal rights unless the state's insistence on com-
pliance with its procedural rule serves a legitimate state inter-
est." 9 Although no such legitimate state interest was found in
Henry, the Court, in remanding the case to determine if the pe-
titioner had intentionally waived his federal claim, cautioned that
while "trial strategy adopted by counsel without prior consulta-
tion with an accused""' would not usually preclude the accused
from asserting constitutional claims, "the deliberate by-passing
by counsel of the contemporaneous objection rule as a part of
trial strategy would have that effect in this case."'"
Since Fay and Henry, both state and federal courts have been
faced with the problem of determining what constitutes a waiver
of federal claims through the deliberate bypass of state proce-
dures. A deliberate bypass is, of course, binding on the petitioner
and acts as a waiver of his constitutional claim when he has
voluntarily and intelligently bypassed state procedures by his
own actions.1 2 But the Fay and Henry directive that has given
the courts the most trouble is that strategic bypasses made by
defense counsel are binding on the petitioner only when he has
acquiesced in them.'3 Some courts have tended to presume this
acquiescence-especially where counsel is retained rather than
strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the
deliberate by-passing of state procedure, then it is open to the federal court
on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his
federal claim on the merits .... At all events we wish it clearly understood
that the standard here put forth depends on the considered choice of the
petitioner. . . . A choice made by counsel not participated In by the peti-
tioner does not automatically bar relief. Nor does a state court's finding
of waiver bar independent determination of the question by the federal
courts on habeas, for waiver affecting federal rights is a federal question."
7. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
8. Henry v. Mississippi, 253 Miss. 263, 154 So.2d 289 (1963).
9. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1965).
10. Id. at 451.
11. Id. at 451-52.
12. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S. 391(1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
13. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S.
391 (1963); Hale v. Boles, 419 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1969); Grimes v. United
States, 396 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1968).
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appointed.14 Others have required some evidence of this acqui-
escence.15 Most courts will not find such a strategic waiver where
there is substantial evidence, usually in the form of the peti-
tioner's statements at trial, that the petitioner did not acquiesce
in his defense counsel's trial strategy." The dilemma facing a
court in considering whether a strategic bypass has taken place
was articulated in a recent case by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which said that to grant relief
would have been to allow "counsel for a defendant to try one
strategy by deliberately using, for his client's benefit, evidence
that could be claimed to be unconstitutionally tainted and then,
if not satisfied with the result, to get a second trial by claiming
that the constitutional taint requires a reversal in spite of his
tactical decision."17
The purpose of this Comment is to survey recent federal
14. The waiver was found to be a part of trial strategy and, hence,
binding upon the petitioner, without further discussion, in the following
cases: United States ex rel. Agron v. Herold, 426 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1970);
Mathis v. Colorado, 425 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1970); Evans v. Cupp, 415 F.2d
844 (9th Cir. 1969); Mize v. Crouse, 399 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1968); United
States ex rel. Budd v. Maroney, 398 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1968); Davis v. Dunbar,
394 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1968). The court, In United States ex rel. Broaddus v.
Rundle, 429 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1970) held to the same effect, but there it
seemed that the defense counsel failed to object because he felt the con-
fessions were actually admissible, not because to fail to object was part of
his trial strategy. In Curry v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110, 113 (9th Cir. 1968), the
trial strategy was also held to be binding upon the petitioner, but the court
also stated that the strategy would have been binding "even though he [the
petitioner] expressly disagreed with it."
15. In Leventhal v. Gavin, 421 F.2d 270, 272 (1st Cir. 1970), "the court
found petitioner knew that counsel was not doing this [perfecting appeal],
but was engaged in other activities, principally seeking to square petitioner
with the parties whom he had allegedly defrauded. This might have resulted
in a better solution to his difficulties, in terms of a motion to reduce sen-
tence, as contrasted with the expense of appealing a case which had oc-
cupied a great many days. The court found confirmation for this conclu-
sion in the fact that after petitioner inescapably realized that he had lost
his right to appeal, he waited five months before claiming in the Superior
Court that he had been mistreated or misled." In both Grimes v. United
States, 396 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1968) and United States ex rel. LaMolinare
v. Duggan, 415 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1969), the court commented upon the tacit
consent of the petitioner to the decision by the defense counsel. Hales v.
Boles, 419 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1969) was remanded to determine if the petitioner
participated in the decision to waive appeal. The petitioner In United States
ex rel. Garcia v. Follette, 417 F.2d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 1969) was bound by the
counsel's actions because he "decided to remain mute during the trial when
this evidence was introduced." See also United States ex rel. Kenny v. Fol-
lette, 410 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969) and Poole v. Fitzharris, 396 F.2d 544 (9th
Cir. 1968).
16. See Lamarr v. Wainwright, 423 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1970); United States
ex rel. Bolognese v. Brierley, 412 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1969); Lessard v. Dickson,
394 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
17. Curry v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110, 113-14 (9th Cir. 1968).
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habeas corpus decisions and formulate possible guidelines for
predicting the federal court's exercise of discretion in granting
writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners. These guidelines will
then be compared with the present handling of federal consti-
tutional claims by the Louisiana judiciary; apparent conflicts
will be noted accordingly.
Principles of General Application
There are certain general principles upon which the doctrine
of waiver by deliberate bypass of state procedure is founded.
The most obvious principle is that the federal courts do not re-
gard the waiver of constitutional rights lightly.'8 For example, in
Fay v. Noia,1 the Supreme Court stated that the bypass of state
procedure would be a waiver only if it met the Johnston v.
Zerbst standard of "an intentional relinquishment of a known
right or privilege. ' 20 Perhaps based on this principle, a rule has
arisen that a federal court cannot find a waiver where the state
court did not find one.21 Similarly, a deliberate bypass does not
exist where the state court has passed upon the merits of a con-
stitutional claim, even if it considered the merits as an after-
thought.22 As a further limitation on the doctrine of waiver,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
held that the discretion to apply the doctrine lies with the federal
district court; when it chooses not to apply the doctrine, the
court of appeals will likewise choose not to apply it. 25 However,
18. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) and Fay v. Nola, 372
U.S. 391 (1963).
19. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
20. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
21. In Anders v. Turner, 379 F.2d 46, 50 (4th Cir. 1967), the court said
that "when, as in the present case, the state court has not declared a waiver
or forfeiture, a federal court is not at liberty to search the state proceedings
to identify a legitimate state interest upon which the state court itself has
not relied. The federal court's discretion to impose a forfeiture is limited to
those instances in which a state court has demonstrated the existence of a
legitimate state interest and has sought to vindicate it."
22. In Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297 n.3
(1967), the Supreme Court, noting that a state court hearing had been held
on the merits of the claim, held that "[tin this circumstance, the Fourth
Circuit was correct in rejecting the State's deliberate-bypassing claim. The
deliberate-bypass rule is applicable only 'to an applicant who has deliberately
by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has for-
feited his state court remedies.'"
23. In Selz v. California, 423 F.2d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 1970), the court held
that "the decision to apply it (the doctrine of waiver by deliberate bypass
of state procedures] rests in the sound discretion of the district court ...
and the district court has not exercised its discretion here." See also Fay v.
Nola, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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in spite of their reluctance to find a waiver of a constitutional
claim, the federal courts have generally held that a constitu-
tional claim which is not raised at trial or on appeal is waived.24
A second principle is that federal writs of habeas corpus are
issued to state prisoners only to remedy the violation of consti-
tutional rights which enjoy "due process" status.25 Hence, only
federal rights which may be raised to the level of "due process"
may involve the issue of waiver by deliberate bypass of state
procedures.26
Failure to Properly and Timely Object
The doctrine of waiver by deliberate bypass of state proce-
dures arises most often in cases where the defense counsel has
failed to properly or timely satisfy the state's objection rules
relative to the use at trial of constitutionally defective confes-
sions or illegally obtained evidence. In the case of objection on
an improper basis, the state appellate court may hold that the
defendant has failed to properly preserve his constitutional
claim.27 After citing the familiar principle that the waiver of a
24. In Lundberg v. Buchkoe, 389 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1968), the court held
that the issue of the voluntariness of a confession was lost because the peti-
tioner had not raised the issue at trial, not because the petitioner had de-
liberately bypassed the state procedure in not objecting. The Fifth Circuit,
in Zerchauskey v. Beto, 396 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1968), emphasized the fact
that the petitioner had not raised the issue at trial but based its denial of
habeas relief on the grounds that "the appellant's failure to call the acces-
sories to the stand was the result of a voluntary and conscious decision in
trial strategy, not mere docile obedience to a Texas statute." But see Pineda
v. Craven, 424 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1970), where the court said that "[t]he
failure to assert his Fourth Amendment claim at the time of the trial or on
appeal does not foreclose Pineda's federal habeas attack unless that failure
was the result of a deliberate bypass or a waiver, complying with the stan-
dard of Johnston v. Zerbst."
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1966): "(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof,
a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ
of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
26. See Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). In Pineda v. Craven, 424 F.2d
369, 371 (9th Cir. 1970), the court held that "no distinction can be drawn be-
tween claimed violations of rights secured by the Fourth Amendment and
those secured by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." The Third Circuit, In
United States ex rel. Cheek v. Russell, 424 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1970), rejected a
petition for habeas because no harmful error was found, but it is doubtful
whether a due process right was involved in the judge's failure to give a re-
quested charge to the jury. In Drew v. Minnesota, 407 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir.
1969), the Eighth Circuit dismissed the habeas petition because there was no
federally guaranteed right violated by the state action.
27. See, e.g., Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Ben-
nett, 414 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1969); Hill v. Beto, 412 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1969);
Patterson v. Brown, 393 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1968); Black v. Beto, 382 F.2d 758
(5th Cir. 1967).
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federal claim is a federal question, the federal habeas court will
usually grant relief if it finds that the defendant did not delib-
erately bypass the state procedure by willfully objecting on an
improper basis.28
In Hill v. Beto,29 the prosecutor argued that the truthfulness
of a confession was a factor to be considered in deciding the
voluntariness of the confession. The defense counsel objected,
saying, "I think it is not a proper inquiry under the Lopez case."80
Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that this
objection was too general and insufficient to present an issue for
review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that "the objection was sufficient to point to the existence
of the federal constitutional right"'81 and reversed the denial of
the writ. Recently, the Fifth Circuit again granted federal habeas
corpus where the objection to the use of unconstitutionally ob-
tained evidence was based upon the failure to lay a proper foun-
dation for its introduction rather than upon the proper basis of
illegal seizure. 82 In Patterson v. Browns the objection to the
use of illegally secured evidence had been directed toward the
invalidity of a search warrant on its face, whereas the proper
basis for objection was the sufficiency of the affidavit attached
thereto. Although the Colorado appellate court refused to hear
the constitutional claim for this reason, 84 the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit found no deliberate bypass of state pro-
cedures because it was inadvertence that brought them into con-
flict with the contemporaneous objection requirements and for-
feited their state remedies. Under Fay v. Noia, such a fictional
waiver of rights cannot bar habeas corpus relief."35
A slightly different problem arises where defense counsel
completely fails to object to the use of improper evidence at trial.
It is in this context that most Henry-type deliberate, strategic
28. See cases cited in note 27 supra.
29. 412 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1969).
30. Id. at 832 n.2.
31. Id. at 833.
32. In Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970), the defense counsel
objected to the admission of a blood sample alleged to have been unconsti-
tutionally obtained.
33. 393 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1968).
34. Brown & Glymph v. People, 158 Colo. 561, 408 P.2d 981 (1965).
35. Patterson v. Brown, 393 F.2d 733, 736 (10th Cir. 1968).
[Vol. 31
1971] COMMENTS
bypasses are found.86 In Lessard v. Dickson, 7 the petitioner
claimed that a white shirt which had been admitted into evi-
dence without objection was the product of an illegal search.
The court upheld the denial of the petition finding a deliberate
failure to object for strategic purposes because "counsel believed
at the time that objection to the admission of the shirt would
have opened up aspects of collateral information and implica-
tions which would have been more harmful in the trial than to
permit the shirt to go in without objection. '3 8 The same court
reached a similar result where the defense counsel "expressly
waived objection" to the introduction of evidence seized during
an illegal search.8 9 The Eighth Circuit found a strategic waiver
of objection to the introduction of a white earring obtained pur-
suant to an illegal arrest where defense counsel had not objected
to its introduction, but had used the earring in his questioning
of the key prosecuting witness.4 It was clear to the court that
defense counsel's trial strategy was to attack the credibility of
the witness by obtaining inconsistent testimony in regard to the
earring.
In a debatable case approaching the limits of Henry, the
Third Circuit, without discussing defense counsel's strategy,
36. See, e.g., Mathis v. Colorado, 425 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1970); United
States ex reL. Moore v. Follette, 425 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex
rel. Garcia v. Follette, 417 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1969); Evans v. Cupp, 415 F.2d
844 (9th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. LaMolinare v. Duggan, 415 F.2d
730 (3d Cir. 1969); Gilreath v. Eyman, 407 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1969); Curry v.
Wilson, 405 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1968); Mize v. Crouse, 399 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.
1968); United States ex rel. Budd v. Maroney, 398 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1968);
Application of Reynolds, 397 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1968); Pope v. Swenson, 395
F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1968); Davis v. Dunbar, 394 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1968); Lessard
v. Dickson, 394 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1968). However, for cases in which there was
no objection at trial, yet no waiver was found, see, e.g., Miller v. Carter, 434
F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1970); Hizel v. Sigler, 430 F.2d 1398 (8th Cir. 1970); Cooper
v. Picard, 428 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1970); Schildan v. Gladden, 426 F.2d 1158
(9th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Cheeks v. Russell, 424 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.
1970); Pineda v. Craven, 424 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1970); Losieau v. Sigler, 421
F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1970); Moreno v. Beto, 415 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson
v. Bennett, 414 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Snyder v. Mazur-
kiewicz, 413 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Jefferson v. Follette,
396 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1968); Woodbury v. Beto, 395 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1968);
United States ex rel. Hill v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1968).
37. 394 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
38. Id. at 92.
39. Davis v. Dunbar, 394 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1968), where the otherwise
valid constitutional claim was waived because "[t]here was, however, no
objection to the introduction of the evidence. In fact, appellant's attorney
expressly waived objection."
40. In Pope v. Swenson, 395 F.2d 321, 324 (8th Cir. 1968), the court stated
that "[d]efense counsel freely cross-examined the witness concerning the
earring and did so with the obvious strategy of attacking Dugan's credibility
on the point as well as many others."
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found a deliberate bypass of the objection to illegally obtained
evidence for strategic purposes, although it appeared defense
counsel had failed to object because he felt the evidence was
admissible. 41 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in Gilreath v. Eyman,42
found an intentional waiver and simply stated that "[a]ppellant's
trial counsel made no objection of any kind at any time to the
admission of the sellers' testimony." However, that court also
found the statements to be voluntary. Where the disputed evi-
dence was actually found to have been illegally obtained, the
same court went into a careful discussion of the strategy em-
ployed by defense counsel before declaring a strategic bypass. 43
Where the court finds that a constitutional right has in fact
been violated, it is less eager to find a deliberate bypass and
looks for either strategic reasons for the failure to object or the
active participation of the petitioner in the bypass.44 In United
States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley,45 the Third Circuit held
that failure to object to the introduction of one of defendant's
statements was not in and of itself a waiver of the right to raise
the issue of voluntariness. However, the facts that counsel failed
to object and that the defendant willingly took the stand to tes-
tify were held to be important considerations. Another circuit,
dealing with the claim of a coerced confession, illustrated how
41. In United States ex rel. LaMolinare v. Duggan, 415 F.2d 730, 732 (3d
Cir. 1969), the court said that "defense counsel, exercising his best judgment
and with at least the tacit consent of his client, decided not to seek to sup-
press the evidence taken from his car. This procedure was consistent with
the line of defense adopted by the accused."
42. 407 F.2d 811, 812 (9th Cir. 1969).
43. Evans v. Cupp, 415 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1969). The evidence was ob-
viously the product of an illegal search and seizure, but the court explained
the counsel's trial strategy as follows: "Counsel's strategy was to admit that
Evans had a shotgun, that he had forced the complaining witness off the
road, and that an act of intercourse had taken place, but to deny that there
was any lack of consent. By not disputing the testimony of the complainant
or any other witness on any issue except consent, and by not objecting to
the introduction of such items as the shotgun and blanket, counsel sought to
persuade the jury of Evans' sincerity and veracity. Counsel was evidently
concerned with avoiding giving the jury the impression that Evans was try-
ing to hide something. Objection would have enhanced the importance of the
gun and the blanket in the eyes of the jury. This was certainly a reason-
able strategy, even though it did not work. And it is binding on Evans."
44. For cases where the court looked for strategy reasons for the failure
to challenge the alleged violation of a constitutional right, see Hizle v. Sigler,
430 F.2d 1398 (8th Cir. 1970); Evans v. Cupp, 415 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States ex rel. Hill v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1968). For cases
where the court emphasized the participation or lack of participation of the
petitioner, see Losieau v. Sigler, 421 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1970); United States
ex rel. Jefferson v. Follette, 396 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1968); Woodbury v. Beto,
395 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1968).
45. 414 F.2d 552 (3d Cir. 1969).
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strictly it looked at the waiver of federal constitutional claims.
There, defense counsel had not asked for a voluntariness hearing
nor objected to the introduction of the confessions. Yet, the
court, emphasizing the mental deficiency of the petitioner, held
that the failure to object plus the fact the defendant had testified
to the same effect did not establish, without more, an intentional
waiver.46
At least one circuit has held that there is no deliberate by-
pass of state procedures through failure to object where defense
counsel "did not know that they [the statements] might have
been excluded. ' '47 The court did not make it clear whether this
was merely a personal lack of knowledge on the part of the at-
torney or whether the claimed constitutional right was not rec-
ognized at the time and, hence, was not known to any attorney.
If the latter were the case, the decision was surely proper since
the uniform rule is that a defendant cannot waive a presently
unknown constitutional right.4 8 However, if the former were the
case, the still unsettled question of the relative binding effect of
decisions of retained, as opposed to appointed, counsel is pre-
sented.
Likewise, inadvertent failure to object will not be deemed a
waiver through deliberate bypass where defense counsel has
objected to similar testimony previously. His intent to object
is considered well known to the court.49 In Douglas v. Alabama,50
the United States Supreme Court ruled that failure to object
after each statement made by a witness pursuant to an improper
line of questioning did not amount to an intentional waiver of
the right to object to the improper questions. Such a burdensome
rule was found to serve no legitimate state interest where coun-
sel had properly objected to the entire line of questioning.
In a few cases, the federal habeas court has even refused
to find a deliberate bypass of state procedures where defense
counsel voluntarily stated "no objection" or refused to object
46. Hizie v. Sigler, 430 F.2d 1398 (8th Cir. 1970).
47. United States ex rel. Hill v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470, 473 (3d Cir. 1968).
48. Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122 (1968); Moreno v. Beto, 415 F.2d 154 (5th
Cir. 1969); Gladden v. Unsworth, 396 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1968).
49. Cooper v. Picard, 428 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1970), where counsel had
strenuously objected to the testimony of each witness who had viewed the
defendant through a one-way mirror, but failed to object to the testimony of
one such witness.
50. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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upon questioning by the judge.51 However, these cases usually
can be explained by the defendant's failure to acquiesce in de-
fense counsel's trial strategy.
52
A decision which seems to go beyond all previous cases is
Miller v. Carter.58 There, the Cailfornia police placed an under-
cover agent in petitioner's jail cell in an effort to obtain incul-
patory statements from her. At a pre-trial conference, defense
counsel objected to the use of this witness at trial. The judge
refused to hear this objection, stating that the proper time to
object would be after the foundation had been laid at trial for
the use of the witness. However, at trial, counsel refused to ob-
ject, but, instead, cross-examined the undercover agent regard-
ing her statements. On petition for federal habeas corpus relief,
the failure to object was not taken as a deliberate bypass be-
cause defense counsel argued that his case would be strongly
prejudiced in the eyes of the jury if he were forced to object to
the use of the witness in their presence, although the grounds
for the objection and the hearing on the objection would have
been held outside the jury's presence. The dissenters found this
to be a classic example of deliberate bypass for strategic pur-
poses.54 However, the decision might be explained on the basis
of a possible failure by the trial judge to follow state law in
holding that the objection in chambers was not sufficient.5 5
Guilty Plea as a Waiver
Recently, in McMann v. Richardson,6 a consolidation of
three habeas corpus petitions, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether a guilty plea was a waiver of unconstitu-
tional pre-trial defects when the plea was motivated by a prior
coerced confession. Because the trials occurred before Jackson
v. Denno,5 which held that the voluntariness of a confession
was not an issue for the jury to decide, there had been no avail-
51. United States ex rel. Snyder v. Mazurkiewicz, 413 F.2d 500 (3d Cir.
1969); United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 378 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1967).
52. See cases cited in note 51 supra.
53. 434 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1970). The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to the California Supreme Court in this case, Miller v. California,
389 U.S. 968 (1967), but the grant was later withdrawn as improvidently
granted, 392 U.S. 616 (1968). However, three Justices dissented and drafted
an opinion which held to the same effect as the majority in Miller v. Carter,
434 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1970).
54. 434 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1970).
55. Id.
56. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
57. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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able way to keep the confessions from the jury. Hence, defen-
dants pleaded guilty on the advice of their counsel. The court of
appeals held that because only a voluntary plea of guilty waived
unconstitutional pre-trial defects, the presence of a coerced con-
fession was a factor to be considered when deciding the volun-
tariness of the guilty plea.5 8 The Supreme Court reversed, how-
ever, holding "that a defendant who alleges that he pleaded
guilty because of a prior coerced confession is not, without more,
entitled to a hearing on his petition for habeas corpus."' 9
Thus, it seems that if the guilty plea is voluntarily and in-
telligently made,60 it will be taken as a deliberate bypass of state
procedures, and a waiver of all unconstitutional pre-trial defects.
However, an exception to this rule would exist where the state
has provided that the defendant could appeal certain constitu-
tional issues despite his plea of guilty.61
Failure to Appeal Properly in the State Courts
It is not unusual for a petition for federal habeas corpus to
be brought after the time limit has expired for appealing through
the state court system. 2 In Anderson v. Nelson 5 the United
States Supreme Court held, without discussion, that the late
filing of a petition for review of constitutional claims in state
court did not constitute "a deliberate bypass of state remedies,
precluding him from habeas corpus relief in federal courts."64
Prior to this case, the Fifth Circuit had followed the standard
of intentional waiver in remanding a case to determine if peti-
tioner had deliberately allowed the time limit for taking the
state appeal to expire.65 In a 1970 case, Lamar v. Wainwright,"
the Fifth Circuit found a deliberate bypass of state procedure
where defendant had filed his petition for federal habeas relief
two days after the time for taking the state appeal had expired.
58. United States ex rel. Ross v. McMann, 409 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1969);
United States ex rel. Williams v. Follette, 408 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1969); United
States ex rel. Richardson v. McMann, 408 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969).
59. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
60. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
61. See United States ex re?. Rogers v. Warden of Attica State Prison,
381 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1967).
62. See, e.g., Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523 (1968); Lamarr v. Wain-
wright, 423 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1970); Baker v. Lee, 384 F.2d 703 (5th Cir.
1967).
63. 390 U.S. 523 (1968).
64. Id. at 525.
65. Baker v. Lee, 384 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1967).
66. 423 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1970).
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The court found that petitioner knew of his right to appeal but
chose to forego it on the injudicious advice of his counsel that
the parole board would be more lenient on him.
The right to appeal may similarly be cut off by a deliberate
bypass of the state procedure for taking appeals. In United
States ex rel. Bolognese v. Brierley, 7 the Third Circuit held that
a defendant who asked his counsel to withdraw his motion for
a new trial and to procure his immediate sentencing had waived
his right to appeal by deliberately bypassing the state proce-
dure for perfecting the appeal. The First Circuit found a de-
liberate bypass of the right to appeal where defense counsel was
busy trying to "square the petitioner with the parties whom he
had allegedly defrauded" and failed to perfect the appeal in
time.68 Although defense counsel did not testify as to why he
allowed the time for perfecting the appeal to expire, the court
found that his conciliatory activities "might have resulted in a
better solution to [the defendant's] difficulties, in terms of a
motion to reduce sentence, as contrasted with the expense of
appealing a case which had occupied a great many days."0' 9 The
court also stressed the defendant's knowledge of the right to ap-
peal and his active participation in the proceedings. However,
where the client has been so dominated by his counsel that the
failure to take the necessary procedural steps to perfect the ap-
peal was not acquiesced in by the defendant, the failure to ap-
peal is not considered a deliberate bypass of state procedures.o
In a rather unusual California case,71 the defense attorney
failed to appeal a drunken driving conviction to the state court
of appeal. Instead, he raised the issue of self-incrimination
through a petition for state habeas corpus relief, which was de-
nied. The denial was affirmed by the state supreme court. Al-
though the federal district court found this to be a deliberate
bypass of state procedures for strategic purposes, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed. That court based its decision on the fact that de-
fense counsel, although able and experienced, had not practiced
in the state court since the new state appellate procedure had
been adopted. Perhaps the true basis for the ruling that the
failure to appeal to the intermediate appellate court did not bar
67. 412 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1969).
68. Leventhal v. Gavin, 421 F.2d 270, 272 (1st Cir. 1970).
69. Id.
70. See Hale v. Boles, 419 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1969).
71. Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969).
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his right to appeal was that the issue had been litigated in the
state supreme court via the state writ of habeas corpus. 72 The
Fifth Circuit has similarly held that litigation of an issue before
the state supreme court via state habeas corpus prevents the
failure to take a direct appeal from acting as a waiver of a con-
stitutional claim.73
Louisiana and the Federal Waiver Standards
The Louisiana courts have not indicated a willingness to
follow the federal waiver standards for deliberate bypass of
state procedures. Considering the previous discussion, there are
at least three areas in which the Louisiana courts could come in
conflict with the federal waiver standards: the use of illegally
seized evidence; the contemporaneous objection rule and the bill
of exceptions procedure; and attacks on the racial composition
of grand juries.
In two 1965 cases,7 4 the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled
that a defendant who fears the use of illegally seized evidence
must "file a pre-trial motion either to quash a search warrant or
to suppress evidence obtained by the prosecution and that failure
to do so, in the absence of a showing of surprise or lack of op-
portunity to file such a motion, operates as a waiver of any
claimed violation of his constitutional rights against illegal search
and seizure. ' 75 This procedure is now codified in article 703 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.7 6 It would seem that the state
has a legitimate interest in this procedure;77 however, the federal
habeas court can be expected to hold that the illegal search and
seizure issue is waived only when the Louisiana procedure is
deliberately and knowingly bypassed.7 8
The general rule in Louisiana is that an "irregularity or
error in the proceedings cannot be availed of after verdict unless
72. Id. at 516. The court said that "counsel's actions are consistent with
a desire to obtain rapid review in the higher California courts and are in
direct contradiction to the State's argument that failure to seek certification
waived rights to review."
73. Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970).
74. State v. Rasheed, 248 La. 309, 178 So.2d 261 (1965); State v. Davidson,
248 La. 161, 177 So.2d 273 (1965).
75. State v. Davidson, 248 La. 161, 163, 177 So.2d 273, 275 (1965).
76. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703.
77. See United States ex rel. LaMolinare v. Duggan, 415 F.2d 730 (3d
Cir. 1969).
78. Pineda v. Craven, 424 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel.
LaMolinare v. Duggan, 415 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1969).
1971]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
it is objected to at the time of its occurrence and a bill of ex-
ceptions reserved to an adverse ruling on such objection."79 The
contemporaneous objection rule is probably valid and would be
treated as discussed previously. However, it is foreseeable that
the legitimate state interest in the bill of exceptions rule could
be questioned, especially in light of the increased tendency to
make transcripts of all trials and the increased number of at-
torneys inexperienced in criminal trials who are forced to defend
indigents. It is suggested that the federal waiver standards would
be satisfied more readily if the trial judge would aid the inex-
perienced attorney in preserving his bill of exceptions, espe-
cially where the failure to properly preserve the bill would not
seem to be part of the attorney's trial strategy or where the de-
fendant's constitutional rights seem to have been actually vio-
lated.
The Louisiana procedure for attacking the racial compo-
sition of a grand jury was considered in Labat v. Bennett.s0
The Fifth Circuit held that the failure to challenge the compo-
sition of a grand jury through a timely filed motion to quash 1L
79. State v. Reed, 252 La. 128, 135, 209 So.2d 730, 732 (1968). This rule was
codified in articles 841 and 920 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. LA. CODE
CRIM. P. art. 841: "An irregularity or error In the proceedings cannot be
availed of after verdict unless it is objected to at the time of its occurrence
and a bill of exceptions is reserved to the adverse ruling of the court on
such objection. Failure to reserve a bill of exceptions at the time of an ad-
verse ruling of the court operates as a waiver of the objection and as an
acquiescence in the irregularity or ruling.
"This requirement shall not apply to:
"(1) A ground for arrest of judgment under Article 859, or the court's
ruling on a motion In arrest of judgment; or
"(2) The court's ruling on a motion for a new trial based on the ground
of bills of exceptions reserved during the trial."
Id. art. 920: "The following matters and no others shall be considered on
appeal:
"(1) Formal bills of exceptions that have been submitted to and signed
by the trial court in accordance with Article 845, whether or not the bills of
exceptions were made a ground for a motion for a new trial; and
"(2) Any error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the plead-
ings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence."
80. 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966).
81. LA. CODE CHIM. P. art. 533: "A motion to quash an indictment by a
grand jury may also be based on one or more of the following grounds:
"(1) The manner of selection of the general venire, the grand jury
venire, or the grand jury was illegal."
Id. art. 535. ". . . B. A motion to quash shall be filed at least three
judicial days before commencement of trial, and may be filed with permis-
sion of the court at any time before commencement of trial, when based on
any of the following grounds:
"(3) A grand jury indictment is invalid because the manner of selection
of the general venire, the grand jury venire, or the grand jury was illegal."
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was not a deliberate bypass of state procedure. However, the
recent United States Supreme Court decision in Parker v. North
Carolina82 casts doubts upon the continuing validity of the Labat
holding. Although the Supreme Court specifically declined to
consider whether the North Carolina procedure,8 3 calling for a
pretrial motion to quash on the basis of the grand jury's racial
composition, would bar collateral attack by federal habeas, the
Court did indicate that the state had a legitimate state interest
in the procedure.84
To summarize, it would seem that the Louisiana waiver
standards are much stricter than the federal waiver standards.
Perhaps it is proper for the Supreme Court of Louisiana to
adhere to these Louisiana standards during direct appeal. If so,
it is suggested that Louisiana courts could better protect their
convictions against federal intervention if the trial judge would
force the defense counsel to make deliberate bypasses of the
state procedural rules at the trial level. A simple, direct ques-
tion from the bench, directed to defense counsel, would often
accomplish this. Such questions would be particularly valuable
where the attorney is inexperienced or where he appears to be
allowing a valid constitutional claim to pass unnoticed. Then,
when the constitutional issues are brought to the district court
or to the state supreme court through an application for state
habeas corpus relief, that court would be in a better position
to find waivers which satisfy the federal standard of "intentional
waivers of known rights or privileges."
Robert Goss Szabo
82. 897 U.S. 790 (1970).
83. The procedure is specified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-23 (1969) and has
been interpreted in State v. Covington, 258 N.C. 501, 128 S.E.2d 827 (1963)
and State v. Rorie, 258 N.C. 162, 128 S.E.2d 229 (1962).
84. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 798-99 (1970): "This state rule
of practice would constitute an adequate state ground precluding our reach-
ing the grand jury issue if this case were here on direct review. . . . We
are under similar constraint when asked to review a state court decision
holding that the same rule of practice requires denial of collateral relief.
Whether the question of racial exclusion in the selection of the grand
jury is open in a federal habeas corpus action we need not decide. ...
[Tihere was an adequate basis in North Carolina procedural law for the
North Carolina Court of Appeals' refusal to consider the claim of racial
exclusion in the composition of the grand jury that indicted petitioner."
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